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This article presents a probabilistic logic L whose sentences can be interpreted
as asserting the acceptability of gambles. The logic L has a concrete syntax
and a complete inference procedure, and it handles conditional as well as
unconditional probabilities. It synthesizes the probabilistic logic of Nils J.
Nilsson [10] and the anytime inference procedure of Alan M. Frisch and Peter
Haddawy [4] with the logic of gambles of Nic Wilson and Seraf¶ ³n Moral [17].
Nilsson and Frisch and Haddawy build their probabilistic logics, which we des-
ignate by LN and LFH, respectively, on top of an underlying logic. According
to their semantics, which we call the measure-theoretic semantics for proba-
bilistic logic, each sentence says something about the probability of a sentence
in the underlying logic. Our probabilistic logic, which we designate by L, also
has an underlying logic, and can use measure-theoretic semantics. When it
does use this semantics, it is a strict generalization of Nilsson's and Frisch and
Haddawy's logics: a sentence in LN or LFH translates into L with no change in
meaning. However, L also contains more complex sentences. Instead of merely
saying something about the probability of an individual sentence of the un-
derlying logic, a sentence in L may say something about the expected value
of a gamble whose payo® depends on the truth values of several sentences in
the underlying logic.
Moreover, whereas Nilsson only discusses how to reason with models, and
Frisch and Haddawy do not demonstrate completeness for their set of inference
rules, we give a complete set of inference rules for L. In generalizing from
probabilities to expected values, we are following Wilson and Moral, and our
demonstration of the completeness of our logic uses the same strategy as a
demonstration of the completeness of their logic, which we designate by LWM.
We go well beyond their results, however, because we handle conditional as
well as unconditional probabilities and we insist on a concrete syntax.
Fagin, Halpern and Meggido [3], have formulated probabilistic logics that use
measure-theoretic semantics, and have complete inference procedures; we des-
ignate them by LFHM. They consider only the case where the underlying
logic is propositional logic, but in this case, their probabilistic logics are more
expressive than ours. In the case where our probabilistic logic L uses measure-
theoretic semantics and uses propositional logic as its underlying logic, it can
be regarded as a relatively small fragment of one of Fagin, Halpern, and Meg-
gido's logics, but it is still of some interest, because it enables complete in-
ference about relatively elementary probability statements (including those
considered by Nilsson and by Frisch and Haddawy) without the greater com-
plexity of Fagin, Halpern, and Meggido's logics. In [6], Halpern and Pucella
consider upper probability measures, and in [7] they add reasoning about
2expectation. There is a large body of other important related work on proba-
bilistic logic that is not directly used in our paper ([2] and [5] include reviews
of this literature). Recently, for example, Biazzo, Gilio, Lukasiewicz and San-
¯lippo [1] have described an approach to probabilistic logic based on betting
schemes, and Lukasiewicz [8] has extended this approach to related nonmono-
tonic probabilistic logics.
What we ¯nd most interesting about L is an alternative semantics that sug-
gests paths for generalization di®erent from the paths followed by other au-
thors. This alternative semantics, which we call behavioral semantics, hews
more closely to the notion of acceptability and can be formalized using the con-
cept of lower prevision developed by Peter Walley [15]. In measure-theoretic
semantics, an interpretation for a probabilistic logic is a probability distri-
bution over interpretations for the underlying logic. A gamble is acceptable
if this probability distribution gives the gamble nonnegative expected value.
But this implies that if a gamble is not acceptable, then the opposite gamble
(the gamble with the signs of all the payo®s reversed) is acceptable. No such
implication is inherent in the notion of a gamble being acceptable, and no
such implication is built into our probabilistic logic (the syntax considered in
this article does not even provide for negation of acceptability statements).
Behavioral semantics avoids these implications and therefore can be extended
to martingale trees [11] and probability games [14]; see [13].
1.1 Comparative Summary
Table 1 summarizes how our logic compares with others. As the table indicates,
our approach is a synthesis of Nilsson's, Frisch and Haddawy's and Wilson
and Moral's, combining the best features of their approaches. We also show
for comparison Fagin, Halpern and Meggiddo's more expressive logics.
LN LFH LWM LFHM L
Complete inference procedure Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Anytime inference procedure No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Elaboration tolerant No Yes No Yes Yes
Concrete syntax No Yes No Yes Yes
Handles conditional probabilities No Yes No Yes Yes
Hyperplane expressive No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 1
Comparison of Related Work
When we say that Nilsson's system does not have an anytime inference proce-
dure, we mean that the linear program must be run to completion. In contrast
our language, like that of Frisch and Haddawy, is modular, and interim infer-
ences are valid even though they may not have computed the tightest possible
bounds at the time computation is stopped.
3Another advantage of modularity is elaboration tolerance: additional premises
can be introduced and additional questions can be asked without discarding
or repeating work already done. Our language, like Frisch and Haddawy's,
is elaboration tolerant in this sense. Notice, however, that we have labeled
Wilson and Moral's language as elaboration intolerant, even though it seems
to have an anytime inference procedure. This is because its inference procedure
takes for granted that the sample space has already been set up. When we
introduce a new sentence, whether as a premise or a goal, old possibilities may
split, according to whether the new sentence is true or false. So no system that
takes the sample space for granted is elaboration tolerant.
Our assertion that Wilson and Moral do not have a concrete syntax refers to
the fact that they do not specify any particular symbolic representation for
their gambles. They specify syntax neither for their probabilistic logic nor for
an underlying logic L0. Nilsson, in contrast, does insist on a concrete syntax
for the underlying logic L0, although he does not specify a syntax for his
probabilistic logic.
When we say that Wilson and Moral do not handle conditional probabilities,
we mean only that they do not do so explicitly. A bound on a conditional
probability can easily be re-expressed as a statement of the type they do han-
dle. When we say that our logic and that of Wilson and Moral are hyperplane
expressive, we are referring to the fact that these logics can express an arbi-
trary linear constraint on a vector of probabilities P, which requires P to lie
on one side of a hyperplane. Such linear constraints can be much more general
than bounds on individual probabilities and conditional probabilities.
Each of these three logics can be seen as a simpli¯cation of the logic L de-
veloped in this article. L is not, however, the most expressive probabilistic
logic possible. It can bound the vector of probabilities P by hyperplanes, and
hence it can express the statement that P is in a given simplex, but it cannot
express more complicated restrictions on P. For example, it cannot express
statements about the probability p of a single sentence in the underlying logic
such as \0:3 · p · 0:5 or 0:5 · p · 0:7." Probabilistic logics that can express
such statements include those of Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo [3], which make
use of rich inferential machinery including all instances of propositional tau-
tologies, modus ponens, all instances of valid formulae about linear inequal-
ities, and four axioms for probability. Semantically, the absence of Boolean
combinations of sentences in our logic is signi¯cant; in particular, sentences in
our logic assert the (conditional) acceptability of gambles|our logic is not de-
signed to express the assertion that a gamble is (conditionally) unacceptable.
Finally, Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo's logics follow an axiomatic approach,
with modus ponens as the single inference rule; in contrast, our logic follows
a natural deduction approach with a single axiom and a number of inference
rules. In our view, this approach is intuitively simpler.
42 Syntax and Inference for L
We designate our probabilistic logic by L. In this section, we describe L's
syntax and inference procedure. This description involves some informal ex-
planation of L's semantics. In the next two sections, we formalize the semantics
in two di®erent ways and demonstrate the soundness and completeness of the
inference procedure with respect to both formalizations.
The sentences of L have the form
h(®1;a1):::(®n;an) j ±i; (1)
where n is a nonnegative integer, ®1;:::;®n and ± are sentences of an under-
lying logic L0, and a1;:::;an are real numbers. The list (®1;a1):::(®n;an)
represents a gamble, which pays the sum of those ai for which the correspond-
ing sentence ®i turns out to be true. Sentence (1) means that this gamble
is acceptable to an agent when his knowledge relative to the sentences in L0
consists of knowledge that ± is true. In the next two sections, we make this
idea into a formal semantics in two di®erent ways. In x3, we formalize it as
the condition that the payo® of the gamble has nonnegative expected value
conditional on ±; because the expected value has to be computed relative to
some probability distribution, this constitutes a use of what we have already
called measure-theoretic semantics for probabilistic logic. In x4, we formalize
it in terms of our behavioral semantics, in which probability distributions are
replaced by lower previsions.
If the sentence ± in L0 is a tautology, then the sentence (1) in L means that
the gamble (®1;a1):::(®n;an) is acceptable a priori. This is the special case
of unconditional acceptability considered by Wilson and Moral. But even here
we di®er from Wilson and Moral by representing gambles in terms of sentences
of an underlying logic rather than merely as functions on a sample space.
2.1 The Underlying Logic L0
We assume that the underlying logic L0 has propositional symbols p, p0, p00,
etc., is two-valued with values in ftrue, falseg, and uses the symbols :, ^, _,
?, and > in the usual way. In particular, (a) the set of sentences includes each
of the propositional symbols, ?, and >, and is closed under :, ^ and _; and
(b) an interpretation ! satis¯es :® if and only if it does not satisfy ®, satis¯es
® ^ ¯ if and only if it satis¯es both ® and ¯, satis¯es ® _ ¯ if and only if it
satis¯es at least one of ® or ¯, never satis¯es ? and always satis¯es >. We use
)0 and ,0, respectively, for derivability and logical equivalence: ®1 )0 ®2
means that ®2 can be derived from ®1 (i.e., ®1 `L0 ®2), and ®1 ,0 ®2 means
5that either can be derived from the other (i.e., ®1 `L0 ®2 and ®2 `L0 ®1).
We assume that L0 has a sound and complete inference procedure, so that
®1 ,0 ®2 holds whenever the two are semantically equivalent. We assume that
L0's inference procedure is complete only because we need this assumption in
order to show completeness for L. It is not needed in order for L's inference
procedure to be well-de¯ned and sound.
We make no further assumptions about L0, but reasoning within L0 is part
of reasoning within L and so details about L0 are relevant to implementation.
Unlike Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo's logics, however, propositional reasoning
takes place only within L0.
Let us write w®0 for the set consisting of all sentences of L0. Given a truth
assignment M for L0, let us designate by !M the interpretation it determines|
this is a mapping from w®0 to ftrue, falseg. And let us write ­0 for the set
consisting of all such interpretations:
­0 := f!M j M is a truth assignment for L0g:
We call ­0 the sample space for L0. This concept should be contrasted with
the notion of the sample space for a ¯nite set of sentences in L0, used in
Nilsson's work. Whereas we might explicitly construct the sample space for a
few hundred sentences, there is no reasonable sense in which we can explicitly
construct ­0. If L0 is undecidable, explicit construction of ­0 is not even the-
oretically possible. But as a theoretical (rather than a computational) object,
­0 will be very useful in our mathematical reasoning about L.
We call any real-valued function on ­0 a variable, and denote by X the set
of all variables. Given a variable X 2 X and a subset A µ ­0, we de¯ne a
variable XA by
X
A(!) :=
(
X(!) if ! 2 A;
0 otherwise: (2)
We call XA the restriction of X to A. We can write XA = X ¢ IA, where the
dot denotes pointwise multiplication and IA is A's indicator variable:
IA(!) :=
(
1 if ! 2 A;
0 otherwise: (3)
Clearly (X1 + X2)A = XA
1 + XA
2 , (rX)A = rXA, and (XA)B = XA\B.
Given ® 2 w®0, let [®] be the subset of ­0 consisting of those truth assignments
that assign ® the value true: [®] := f! 2 ­0 j !(®) = trueg. Then the set
A0 := f[®] j ® 2 w®0g is a ¯eld of subsets of ­0; it is isomorphic to L0's
Lindenbaum-Tarski ¯eld. We call a ¯nitely additive probability measure on
the ¯eld A0 a probability distribution on ­0.
62.2 Gambles in L0
We call an ordered pair (®;a), where ® 2 w®0 and a is a real number, a ticket.
We call a list (®1;a1):::(®n;an), where n is a nonnegative integer and the
(®i;ai) are tickets, a gamble. The ®i are the sentences of the gamble; the ai
are the payo®s. The integer n may be zero; in this case the gamble is an empty
list. Notice also that a ticket may occur in a gamble more than once. We write
Gamble for the set consisting of all gambles. We use meta-variables such as
G;G0, etc. to designate gambles without specifying their tickets.
Given a gamble G = (®1;a1):::(®n;an), we de¯ne a variable XG by
XG(!) :=
X
faij1 · i · n and !(®i) = trueg =
n X
i=1
ai ¢ I[®i](!): (4)
We call XG the variable representation for the gamble G. Many di®erent gam-
bles can be represented by the same variable. We call a variable X simple if
X = XG for some gamble G. A variable is simple if and only if (1) it takes
only a ¯nite number of values, and (2) for each real number r, there exists ® 2
w®0 such that f! j X(!) = rg = [®] (in the language of probability theory, X
is measurable with respect to A0).
Here is our notation for manipulating gambles:
² Given a gamble G = (®1;a1):::(®n;an) and a sentence ¯ in L0, we write
G¯ for the result of conjoining each ®i with ¯:
G
¯ := (®1 ^ ¯;a1):::(®n ^ ¯;an):
² Given a gamble G = (®1;a1):::(®n;an) and a real number r, we write rG
for the result of multiplying each ai by r:
rG := (®1;ra1):::(®n;ran):
² Given gambles G = (®1;a1):::(®n;an) and G0 = (¯1;b1):::(¯m;bm), we
write GG0 for the result of concatenating G and G0:
GG
0 := (®1;a1):::(®n;an)(¯1;b1):::(¯m;bm):
These manipulations a®ect the variable representation in obvious and straight-
forward ways: XG¯ = X
[¯]
G (see equation (2)), XrG = rXG, and XGG0 =
XG + XG0.
We sometimes want to append a ticket to a gamble or remove an instance of
a ticket from a gamble:
7² Appending a ticket to a gamble means adding it at the end, without re-
gard to whether it already occurs in the gamble. For example, the result of
appending (¯;b) to (®;a)(¯;b)(°;c) is (®;a)(¯;b)(°;c)(¯;b).
² Removing an instance of (¯;b) from (®;a)(¯;b)(°;c)(¯;b) can result in
either (®;a)(¯;b)(°;c) or (®;a)(°;c)(¯;b).
Here are ten important ways of changing a gamble we call elementary moves:
0 permute the order of the tickets
1 append (®;0)
2 remove an instance of (®;0)
3 append (?;a)
4 remove an instance of (?;a)
5 remove an instance of (®;a), and append
(®;a1) and (®;a2), where a1 + a2 = a
6 remove an instance of (®;a1) and an instance of
(®;a2), and append (®;a1 + a2)
7 remove an instance of (®;a), and append (¯;a)
and (°;a), where ¯ ^ ° ,0 ? and ¯ _ ° ,0 ®
8 remove an instance of (¯;a) and an instance of
(°;a), and append (®;a), where ¯ ^ ° ,0 ?
and ¯ _ ° ,0 ®
9 remove an instance of (®;a) and append (¯;a),
where ¯ ,0 ®
We say that two gambles G and G0 equivalent if we can get from one to
the other by elementary moves|i.e., if there is a ¯nite sequence of gambles
G1;:::;Gk such that G1 = G, Gk = G0, and Gi+1 can be obtained from Gi by
an elementary move, for i = 1;:::;k¡1. This is evidently an equivalence rela-
tion. Elementary moves in part are similar to Fagin, Halpern, and Meggido's
valid formulae about linear equalities and in part capture intuitions regarding
the decomposition of gambles and the nature of probability.
Proposition 2.1 Gambles G and G0 are equivalent if and only if XG = XG0.
It is easy to see that XG = XG0 when G0 is obtained from G by an elementary
move, and this implies that XG = XG0 whenever G and G0 are equivalent. So
our task is to show that XG = XG0 implies the equivalence of G and G0.
To do so, we introduce some additional concepts. We say that two of L0's sen-
tences ® and ¯ are disjoint if ®^¯ ,0 ? and that a gamble (®1;a1):::(®n;an)
is in standard form if the following conditions are satis¯ed:
² The sentences are disjoint: ®i ^ ®j ,0 ? for i 6= j.
² No sentence is absurd: ®i 6,0 ? for all i.
² No payo® is zero: ai 6= 0 for all i.
² The payo®s are distinct and in increasing order: a1 < ¢¢¢ < an.
8Lemma 2.2 Any gamble is equivalent to a gamble in standard form.
Proof: Consider a gamble G = (®1;a1):::(®n;an). By repeated elementary
moves of type 7, we can reduce G to an equivalent gamble G1 in which every
ticket's sentence has the form
¯1 ^ ¢¢¢ ^ ¯n; (5)
where for each i, either ¯i = ®i or else ¯i = :®i. (We ignore the placement of
parentheses in the expression (5), but we assume that these parentheses are
placed in some canonical way, using if necessary elementary moves of type 9.)
Any two sentences in G1 are either disjoint or equivalent. Using elementary
moves of type 6 and 9, we can consolidate the tickets with equivalent sentences,
reducing G1 to an equivalent gamble G2 whose sentences are disjoint. Using
repeated elementary moves of type 8, we can reduce G2 to an equivalent
gamble G3 whose sentences are still disjoint and whose payo®s are all distinct.
Elementary moves of types 0, 2, and 4 will then reduce G3 to an equivalent
gamble in standard form.
Lemma 2.3 If G and G0 are in standard form, and XG = XG0, then G and
G0 are equivalent.
Proof: As XG = XG0, the two gambles must have the same list of payo®s
a1;:::;an. Since G and G0 are in standard form, G = (®1;a1):::(®n;an) and
G0 = (¯1;a1):::(¯n;an), where [®i] = [¯i] for i = 1;:::;n. So ®i ,0 ¯i, and
G can be transformed into G0 by elementary moves of type 9.
We complete the proof of Proposition 2.1 by considering two gambles G1 and
G2 such that XG1 = XG2 and showing that they are equivalent. By Lemma 2.2,
we have gambles G0
1 and G0
2 that are in standard form and are equivalent to
G1 and G2 respectively. The equivalence of G0
i and Gi implies that XG0
i = XGi,
and hence that XG0
1 = XG0
2. By Lemma 2.3, G0
1 and G0
2 are equivalent. Hence
G1 and G2 are equivalent.
2.3 The Syntax of L
A sentence of L is any expression of the form (1), where n is a nonnegative
integer, ± and ®;:::;®n are sentences of L0, and a1;:::;an are real numbers.
Notice that n is allowed to be zero, so that h j ±i is a sentence of L.
We write w® for the set consisting of all sentences of L. For a sentence
h(®1;a1):::(®n;an) j ±i in w® we call (®1;a1):::(®n;an) its gamble, and ±
its condition. We use meta-variables such as S;S0, etc. to designate elements
of w® without specifying their gambles or conditions.
9We do not form negations of the sentences in L: when S is a sentence of L,
:S is not a sentence in L. Nor do we form conjunctions or disjunctions.
2.4 Inference in L
We now de¯ne an inference relation ` for L.
We adopt one axiom schema and ¯ve inference rules. The axiom schema applies
to any ®;± 2 w®0 while the inference rules apply to any G;G0 2 Gamble, and
any ±;² 2 w®0.
Acceptability
Rationality ` h(®;1) j ±i.
Substitution hG j ±i ` hG0 j ±i if G and G0 are equivalent.
Combination fhG j ±i;hG0 j ±ig ` hGG0 j ±i.
Scaling hG j ±i ` hrG j ±i if r ¸ 0.
Conditioning
Contingency hG j ±i ` hG± j ²i if ± )0 ².
Updating hG± j ²i ` hG j ±i if ± )0 ².
The axiom schema and ¯rst three rules capture our notion of the accept-
ability of gambles, consistent with Wilson and Moral's approach or Walley's
sense of desirability as applied to our formal notion of gambles. Thus, a gam-
ble in which we can only win is always acceptable; an acceptable gamble is
acceptable no matter how it is written; the combination of acceptable gam-
bles is acceptable, and a multiple or fraction of an acceptable gamble is itself
acceptable. The conditioning rules, on the other hand, are exactly what is
needed to capture a particular interpretation of conditional probabilities (the
\called-o® bet" interpretation implicit in Frisch and Haddawy's system). Un-
der this interpretation, conditional probabilities can be de¯ned in terms of
unconditional probabilities, and so our logic could be formulated more simply
without using conditioning sentences. Whether the conditioning rules appear
trivial or deep depends, of course, on one's intuitions regarding the nature of
conditional probabilities. Our intention in future work, however, is to study
variants of our logic L in which the acceptability axiom and rules are retained
in conjunction with weaker conditioning rules, and conditioning sentences then
remain fundamental. In particular, we are interested in studying weaker forms
of Updating.
Inference proceeds in the usual way. One starts with a set of premises and
enlarges it in steps, including at each either an axiom or a sentence whose
inference is authorized from sentences already in the set by one of the inference
rules. If ¡ µ w®, S 2 w®, and we can infer S from ¡, then we write ¡ ` S.
10Implementing the inference rules involves, of course, using the inference proce-
dure of the underlying logic L0. In order to use Contingency, for example,
we must show that ² can be inferred from ±. Inference in L0 enters even into
the use of Substitution, since we need to demonstrate equivalence or impli-
cation in L0 in order to prove the equivalence of two gambles.
The following proposition lists some elementary consequences of our inference
rules.
Proposition 2.4 (1) hG j ±i ` hG± j ±i and hG± j ±i ` hG j ±i.
(2) hG j ±i ` hG± j >i and hG± j >i ` hG j ±i.
(3) If ± ,0 ², then hG j ±i ` hG j ²i.
Proof: We obtain the two inferences in Statement 1 by setting ² equal to ± in
Contingency and Updating, respectively. We similarly obtain Statement 2
by setting ² equal to >. To derive Statement 3, we start with hG j ±i, use
Contingency to get hG± j ²i, use the equivalence of the gambles G± and G²,
together with Substitution, to get hG² j ²i, and then use Updating to get
hG j ²i.
It is noteworthy that the logic L includes an absurdity|a sentence from which
any other sentence can be inferred. This is the sentence h(>;¡1) j >i. This
sentence says that our agent is willing to give away $1 a priori, and the infer-
ence rules allow us to infer from this that he will be willing to give away any
amount of money under any other state of knowledge ±. If ¡ ` h(>;¡1) j >i,
then we say that ¡ is incoherent. More generally, if ¡ ` h(±;¡1) j ±i, then we
say that ¡ is incoherent in ±.
3 Measure-Theoretic Semantics for L
As we have already explained informally, we can adapt the measure-theoretic
semantics for our language L by using the notion of conditional expected value:
² An interpretation of L is a probability distribution P on the sample space
­0.
² An interpretation P satis¯es a sentence hG j ±i if P's expected value for
the variable XG (see equation (4)), conditional on ±, is nonnegative.
This de¯nition of satisfaction is only informal. Our formal de¯nition will re-
solve the indeterminacy of conditional expected value when the condition ± has
probability zero in a way consistent with Frisch and Haddawy: the sentence is
satis¯ed by the interpretation in this case.
11In this section, we study the entailment relation for L based on this measure-
theoretic semantics and then show that the inference procedure we described
in the preceding section is sound and complete with respect to this relation.
We explain our alternative semantics, behavioral semantics in the next section.
3.1 Entailment Under Measure-Theoretic Semantics
Formally, we say that P satis¯es h(®1;a1):::(®n;an) j ±i if
n X
i=1
ai ¢ P([®i] \ [±]) ¸ 0: (6)
This inequality is equivalent to
n X
i=1
ai ¢
P([®i] \ [±])
P([±])
¸ 0; (7)
provided that we agree to the convention that the ratio P([®i]\[±])=P([±]) is
equal to zero (and hence inequality (7) is satis¯ed) whenever the denominator,
P([±]), is equal to zero. The left-hand side of inequality (7) is the conditional
expected value of the variable corresponding to the gamble (®1;a1):::(®n;an),
conditional on the event [±]. This justi¯es the informal de¯nition we o®ered a
moment ago: P satis¯es hG j ±i if the expected value of XG, conditional on ±,
is nonnegative. This treatment of conditional probability is mandated by the
called-o® bet interpretation of conditional probability discussed earlier.
If we write G for the gamble (®1;a1):::(®n;an), then we can rewrite the
inequality (6) as a condition on the variable representation for G:
EPX
[±]
G ¸ 0; (8)
where EP represents the expected value operator for P.
We write j=m for the measure-theoretic entailment relation for L: ¡ j=m S
if and only if P satis¯es S whenever P satis¯es S0 for all S0 2 ¡. As usual,
we abbreviate ¡ j=m S to j=m S when ¡ is empty; this means that every
interpretation P satis¯es S.
3.2 Soundness Under Measure-Theoretic Semantics
Now we verify that L's inference procedure is sound with respect to measure-
theoretic semantics: if ¡ ` G, then ¡ j=m G. It su±ces to show that the axioms
and the inference rules are sound.
12Rationality ` h(®;1) j ±i.
Every interpretation P satis¯es h(®;1) j ±i, because inequality (6) reduces
to P([®]\[±]) ¸ 0 for this sentence, and a probability is always nonnegative.
Substitution hG j ±i ` hG0 j ±i if G and G0 are equivalent.
Soundness follows from the fact that inequality (6) can be put in the form (8)
and the fact that equivalent gambles have the same variable representation
(Proposition 2.1).
Combination fhG j ±i;hG0 j ±ig ` hGG0 j ±i.
Soundness follows from inequality (8) and the relation X
[±]
GG0 = X
[±]
G + X
[±]
G0.
Scaling hG j ±i ` hrG j ±i if r ¸ 0.
Soundness follows from inequality (8) and the relation X
[±]
rG = rX
[±]
G .
Contingency hG j ±i ` hG± j ²i if ± )0 ².
Here we use inequality (8) and the calculation X
[²]
G± = (X
[²]
G )[±] = X
[²]\[±]
G ;
when ± )0 ², [²] \ [±] = [±].
Updating hG± j ²i ` hG j ±i if ± )0 ².
Soundness follows by the same argument as for Contingency.
3.3 Completeness Under Measure-Theoretic Semantics
We ¯rst establish several results that we use later in our demonstration:
Lemma 3.1 If X
[±]
G = X
[±0]
G0 , then hG j ±i ` hG0 j ±0i.
Proof: We have hG j ±i ` hG± j ± _ ±0i by Contingency. Our hypothesis
X
[±]
G = X
[±0]
G0 implies XG± = XG0±0. So by Proposition 2.1, G± and G0±0 are
equivalent, and therefore hG± j ± _ ±0i ` hG0±0 j ± _ ±0i by Substitution.
Finally, hG0±0 j ± _ ±0i ` hG0 j ±0i by Updating.
Lemma 3.2 If r > 0 and X
[±0]
G0 = rX
[±]
G , then hG j ±i ` hG0 j ±0i.
Proof: We have hG j ±i ` hrG j ±i by Scaling. And because our hypothesis
can be written in the form X
[±0]
G0 = X
[±]
rG, we have hrG j ±i ` hG0 j ±0i by
Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.3 If X
[±]
G = X
[±1]
G1 + X
[±2]
G2 , then fhG1 j ±1i;hG2 j ±2ig ` hG j ±i.
Proof: Because X
[±i]
Gi = XGi
±i = X
[±1_±2]
Gi
±i (i = 1;2), we can infer hG
±1
1 j ±1 _ ±2i
and hG
±2
2 j ±1 _ ±2i by Lemma 3.1. We can then infer hG
±1
1 G
±2
2 j ±1 _ ±2i by
Combination. Because X
[±1_±2]
G1
±1G1
±1 = X
[±1_±2]
G1
±1 +X
[±1_±2]
G2
±2 = X
[±1]
G1 +X
[±2]
G2 = X
[±]
G ,
we can then infer hG j ±i by Lemma 3.1.
13In the style used by Wilson [16] for an extended version of Wilson and Moral's
logic, we sketch the outline of a proof that L's inference procedure is complete
under our measure-theoretic semantics: if ¡ is ¯nite and ¡ j=m S, then ¡ ` S.
It is convenient to consider the variable representation of gambles, and to rely
on the fact that our gambles are ¯nite: each contains only a ¯nite number of
tickets. A ¯nite ¡ therefore involves only a ¯nite set of sentences in w®0 that
use only a ¯nite set of propositional symbols fpigk
i=1. We write w®¤ for the set
of sentences generated by fpigk
i=1. Given a truth assignment M¤ for fpigk
i=1,
we designate by !M¤ the interpretation it determines|a mapping from w®¤
to ftrue, falseg. We write ­¤ := f!M¤ j M¤ is a truth assignment for fpigk
i=1g
and A¤ := f[®]¤ j ® 2 w®¤g. Clearly, there are only a ¯nite number of di®erent
interpretations determined in this way; i.e, ­¤ and A¤ are ¯nite. For each
! 2 ­0 there is a !¤ 2 ­¤ that agrees with ! for each member of w®¤, and
vice versa. For each ¯nitely additive probability measure P on A0 there is a
¯nitely additive probability measure P¤ on A¤ that agrees with it on A¤, and
vice versa. Each P¤ is de¯ned by its values on the individual ! 2 ­¤. Note
that for any S 2 ¡, P satis¯es S if and only if P¤ satis¯es S. Hence, the P¤
form a new set of restricted models for L.
A sentence hG j ±i 2 ¡ has the variable representation X
[±]
G , a real-valued
function on ­0. For each such variable X
[±]
G we can identify a variable X¤
[±]
G
which is a real-valued function on ­¤ such that X
[±]
G (!) = X¤
[±]
G (!¤). We write
S¤ for the variable on ­¤ generated in this way by a sentence S 2 ¡ when its
gamble and condition are unspeci¯ed. Though we proved them in their more
general form, Lemmas 3.1 to 3.3 apply also to the restricted variables on ­¤.
We write I¤ for the set of indicator variables I¤ := fIfwg j w 2 ­¤g. For each
! 2 ­¤ there is a sentence ®! 2 w®¤ such that the indicator variable on ­¤
If!g = XG! = X
[>]
G!, where G! := (®!;1); by Rationality, ` h(®!;1) j >i.
The set of variables on ­¤ forms a linear space, which we denote by X. A
subset of X that is closed under addition and multiplication by non-negative
scalars is called a convex cone. Given ¡ µ X, we write C(¡) for the smallest
convex cone containing ¡:
C(¡) := fr1X1 + ::: + rnXnjn ¸ 1;0 · ri 2 R;Xi 2 ¡g:
We call a convex cone ¢ ¯nite if ¢ = C(¡) for a ¯nite ¡. We de¯ne the inner
product of two variables X and Y by XY :=
P
!2­¤ X(!)Y (!), and we de¯ne
the dual cone ¡+ of a subset ¡ µ X by:
¡
+ := fX 2 X j XY ¸ 0 for all Y 2 ¡g:
We make use of a number of properties of ¯nite cones (see Nering [9]):
14Theorem 3.4 (Re°exivity of ¯nite convex cones) If ¢ is a ¯nite con-
vex cone, then it is re°exive; i.e. (¢+)+ = ¢.
This theorem follows from a number of fundamental results on ¯nite cones
and dual cones [9]. We also use the following property of dual cones:
Theorem 3.5 For any ¡1 µ X and ¡2 µ X, if ¡1 µ ¡2 then ¡
+
1 ¶ ¡
+
2
In order to apply these results to establish the ¯nite completeness of our logic
L, we ¯rst de¯ne, for a set of sentences ¡:
the restricted variable representation of ¡, ¡¤ := fX¤
[±]
G j hG j ±i 2 ¡g
the set of syntactic consequences of ¡, Con` := fX¤
[±]
G j ¡ ` hG j ±ig;
the set of semantic consequences of ¡, Conj= := fX¤
[±]
G j ¡ j=m hG j ±ig; and
the set of non-negative functions, R := fR 2 L j R(!) ¸ 0 for all ! 2 ­¤g.
Proposition 3.6 For a ¯nite set of sentences ¡:
(1) Conj=(¡) = (¡+
¤ \ R)+
(2) ¡+
¤ \ R = Con`(¡)+ \ R
(3) Con`(¡) = C(¡¤ [ I¤)
(4) (C(¡¤ [ I¤))+ \ R = (C(¡¤ [ I¤))+
(5) Conj=(¡) = (Con`(¡)+)+
(6) Conj=(¡) = Con`(¡)
Proof:
(1) Conj=(¡) = (¡+
¤ \ R)+
Conj=(¡) = fX¤
[±]
G j P satis¯es hG j ±i whenever P satis¯es Y
for every Y 2 ¡g
= fX¤
[±]
G j P¤ satis¯es hG j ±i whenever P¤ satis¯es Y
for every Y 2 ¡g
= fX 2 X j TX ¸ 0 for every T 2 R such that TY ¸ 0
for every Y 2 ¡¤g
= (¡+
¤ \ R)+, by the de¯nition of dual cones.
(2) ¡+
¤ \ R = Con`(¡)+ \ R
¡+
¤ \ R µ fT j TY ¸ 0 for every Y 2 ¡¤, where T is
a non-negative multiple of a probability measureg
µ fT j TY ¸ 0 for every Y 2 Con`(¡), where T is
a non-negative multiple of a probability measureg
since by Soundness if Y 2 Con`(¡) then Y 2 Conj=(¡)
µ Con`(¡)+ \ R.
¡+
¤ ¶ Con`(¡)+ by Theorem 3.5 as ¡¤ µ Con`(¡) by de¯nition, so
¡+
¤ \ R ¶ Con`(¡)+ \ R.
Hence, ¡+
¤ \ R = Con`(¡)+ \ R.
15(3) Con`(¡) = C(¡¤ [ I¤)
Con`(¡) ¶ C(¡¤ [ I¤) from the de¯nitions, the observation
that the members of I¤ are variable representations of theorems,
and Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3.
Con`(¡) µ C(¡¤ [ I¤) from the de¯nitions, the observation that
X¤
[±]
(®;1) = I[®\±], the fact that by Proposition 2.1 equivalent gambles
are represented by the same variable, and the observation that
Contingency and Updating do not change the variable
representation of sentences as shown by the calculations used above
in establishing Soundness.
(4) (C(¡¤ [ I¤))+ \ R = (C(¡¤ [ I¤))+
(C(¡¤ [ I¤))+ = fT j TX ¸ 0 for every X 2 C(¡¤ [ I¤)g.
For every ! 2 ­¤, If!g 2 C(¡¤ [ I¤) and so
for every T 2 (C(¡ [ I))+, T(!) ¸ 0 for every ! 2 ­¤;
i.e., for every T 2 (C(¡ [ I))+, T 2 R.
Thus, (C(¡ [ I))+ \ R = (C(¡ [ I))+.
(5) Conj=(¡) = (Con`(¡)+)+
By applying (1), (2), (3), (4), and (3) in turn.
(6) Conj=(¡) = Con`(¡)
By (3), Con`(¡) is a ¯nite convex cone, and so by Theorem 3.4
Con`(¡) = (Con`(¡)+)+; hence, by (5)
Conj=(¡) = Con`(¡)
To complete our demonstration of ¯nite completeness, suppose ¡ j=m S, where
¡ = fhG1 j ±1i;:::;hGk j ±kig and S = hG j ±i:
Then X¤
[±]
G 2 Conj=(¡), and so by Proposition 3.6 (6) X¤
[±]
G 2 Con`(¡); i.e.,
there is a sentence hG0 j ±0i such that ¡ ` hG0 j ±0i and X¤
[±0]
G0 = X¤
[±]
G . By
Lemma 3.1, hG0 j ±0i ` hG j ±i. Consequently, ¡ ` hG j ±i; i.e., ¡ ` S:
4 Behavioral Semantics for L
In our behavioral semantics for L, which we study in this section, we replace
the concept of a probability distribution with a concept of lower prevision
adapted from Walley [15]. The context for this section is the syntax and in-
ference procedure for L that we developed in x2. In particular, an underlying
logic L0 is in place, and the sample space ­0 is de¯ned. We leave aside, how-
ever, the semantics developed in x3 to study a di®erent semantics for the same
syntax and inference procedure.
164.1 Lower Previsions
Suppose ­ is a nonempty set and A is a ¯eld of subsets of ­. Write X for the
linear space consisting of all real-valued functions on ­ that are measurable
with respect to A and take only ¯nitely many values. We call a real-valued
function P on X a lower prevision for ­ if it satis¯es these three conditions:
(1) P(X) ¸ inffX(!) j ! 2 ­g for all X 2 X.
(2) P(X1 + X2) ¸ P(X1) + P(X2) for all X1;X2 2 X.
(3) P(rX) = rP(X) for all r ¸ 0 and X 2 X.
We call a lower prevision satisfying condition 2 with equality for all X1;X2 2 X
a linear prevision.
The following proposition gives some insight into the concepts of lower previ-
sion and linear prevision by relating them to more familiar concepts.
Proposition 4.1 (1) A real-valued function P on X is a linear prevision if
and only if there is a ¯nitely additive probability measure P on (­;A)
such that
P(X) = EPX for all X 2 X:
(Here EP is the expected value operator for P.)
(2) A real-valued function P on X is a lower prevision if and only if it is the
lower envelope of the expected value operators for a set of ¯nitely additive
probability measures|i.e., if and only if there is a set ¤ of ¯nitely additive
probability measures on (­;A) such that
P(X) = inf
P2¤EPX for all X 2 X:
Statement 1 is proven in x3.2 of Walley [15] and Statement 2 in x3.3. Notice,
however, that our terminology is not quite the same as Walley's. He calls
any real-valued function on any set of bounded real-valued functions on ­
a lower prevision, and he relates the three conditions that we have used as
the de¯nition of lower prevision to a concept that he calls coherence. For an
explanation of our disagreement with Walley regarding coherence, see [13].
Our motivation for considering lower previsions does not derive from their
relation to probability measures. On the contrary, we regard lower previsions
as more fundamental than probability measures, because they emerge more
directly from the idea of the acceptability of gambles. For the moment, let us
follow Wilson and Moral by thinking of the elements of X as gambles, and let
us write C for the subset of X consisting of the gambles we consider acceptable.
What should C look like? According to the intuition that underlies both our
17inference procedure for L and our de¯nition of lower prevision, C should satisfy
three conditions (see also Walley [15]):
(1) If X1;:::;Xn 2 C, and r1;:::;rn are positive real numbers, then r1X1 +
¢¢¢ + rnXn 2 C.
(2) If inf!2­ X(!) ¸ 0, then X 2 C.
(3) ¡1 = 2 C.
But it is easy to verify that if C veri¯es these conditions, and we set
P(X) = supfa j X ¡ a 2 Cg (9)
for all X 2 X, then P quali¯es as a lower prevision, and
P(X) ¸ 0 if and only if X 2 C:
(Accepting X ¡ a is the same as paying a for X, and so (9) is the most one
will pay for X. Thus P(X) ¸ 0 if and only if one will pay 0 for X.)
Conversely, if we start with a lower prevision P, and set C := fX j P(X) ¸ 0g,
then C will satisfy our three conditions. So we could de¯ne our behavioral
semantics directly in terms of C rather than P. This would make behavioral
semantics much more transparent. Using lower previsions has the advantage,
however, of emphasising the similarities with measure-theoretic semantics.
4.2 Entailment Under Behavioral Semantics
Here are the de¯nitions of interpretation and satisfaction in our behavioral
semantics for L:
² An interpretation is a lower prevision on ­0.
² An interpretation P satis¯es a sentence hG j ±i if
P(X
[±]
G ) ¸ 0: (10)
This is quite parallel to measure-theoretic semantics, where an interpretation,
a probability distribution P on ­0, satis¯es hG j ±i if EP(X
[±]
G ) ¸ 0. Because
the expected value operators for probability distributions are a special kind of
lower prevision (namely, linear previsions), we may say that behavioral seman-
tics generalizes measure-theoretic semantics. We write j=b for the entailment
relation for logic L determined by this new de¯nition of satisfaction.
184.3 Soundness Under Behavioral Semantics
The demonstration that L's axioms and inference rules are sound with respect
to behavioral semantics proceeds just like the demonstration with respect to
measure-theoretic semantics (x3.2).
4.4 Completeness Under Behavioral Semantics
The completeness of L under behavioral semantics follows easily from its com-
pleteness under measure-theoretic semantics.
Suppose, indeed, that ¡ j=b S, where
¡ = fhG1 j ±1i;:::;hGk j ±kig and S = hG j ±i:
This means that if P is a lower prevision and P(X
[±i]
Gi ) ¸ 0 for i = 1;:::;k,
then P(X
[±]
G ) ¸ 0. Because a linear prevision is a lower prevision, this means
in particular that if EPX
[±i]
Gi ¸ 0 for i = 1;:::;k, then EPX
[±]
G ¸ 0. In other
words, ¡ j=m S, where j=m is the entailment relation under measure-theoretic
semantics. So we obtain ¡ ` S from completeness under measure-theoretic
semantics.
5 Expressibility and Proof in L
A sentence in LN expresses a bound on the probability of a sentence in the
underlying logic, while a sentence in LFH expresses bounds on the conditional
probability of such a sentence (in this case, a sentence in propositional logic).
Any bound on the probability or conditional probability of a sentence can
be expressed as the condition that a particular gamble has a nonnegative
expected value, and therefore both LN and LFH can be regarded as fragments
of our more expressive logic L. There is however, more to say, especially in
the case of LFH, which has formal inference rules. Just how do sentences in
LN or LFH translate into sentences in L, and how are LFH's inference rules
related to L's?
Nilsson, in LN, began with sentences of the form P(®) = a and inferred sen-
tences of the more general forms a · P(®) and P(®) · b. In order to translate
these sentences into L, we can be guided by a fact about the common seman-
tics: the probability of an event A under an interpretation P is the same as
the expected value under P of the indicator variable IA. This produces the
translations shown in Table 2.
19Sentence in LN Equivalent condition on P Sentence in L
a · P(®) EP(I[®] ¡ a) ¸ 0 h(®;1)(>;¡a) j >i
P(®) · b EP(b ¡ I[®]) ¸ 0 h(>;b)(®;¡1) j >i
Table 2
Translating from Nilsson's logic LN to L.
In Frisch and Haddawy's logic LFH, a sentence simultaneously expresses a
lower and an upper bound on a conditional probability:
P(® j ±) 2 [a;b]: (11)
How should we translate this sentence into L? The most natural approach
might be to add the condition ± to the translations of a · P(®) and P(®) · b
in Table 2. This produces two sentences:
h(®;1)(>;¡a) j ±i and h(>;b)(®;¡1) j ±i: (12)
Another approach is to translate the sentence (11) directly into a condition
on an interpretation P:
a ·
P([®] \ [±])
P([±])
· b: (13)
Under the convention that the ratio is zero when its denominator is zero,
condition (13) is equivalent to the two conditions
P([®] \ [±]) ¡ a ¢ P([±]) ¸ 0 and b ¢ P([±]) ¡ P([®] \ [±]) ¸ 0;
and these two conditions are naturally expressed in L by the two sentences
h(® ^ ±;1)(±;¡a) j >i and h(±;b)(® ^ ±;¡1) j >i (14)
Both (12) and (14) are correct; the sentences h(®;1)(>;¡a) j ±i and h(® ^
±;1)(±;¡a) j >i are equivalent to each other, and the sentences h(>;b)(®;¡1) j
±i and h(±;b)(® ^ ±;¡1) j >i are equivalent to each other. Because the sen-
tences (11) in LFH have the same interpretation as the sentences (14) in L
(both mean that the condition (13) holds under the convention that the ratio
is zero when the denominator is zero), this translation is in fact a translation of
LFH into our probabilistic logic. So we may say that we have extended Frisch
and Haddawy's logic and added a sound and complete inference procedure.
Together with the soundness of their inference rules, this implies that their
inference rules are consequences of ours.
There is one complication, deriving from the fact one of Frisch and Haddawy's
is represented by two of our sentences. Because of their representation, Frisch
and Haddawy introduce the following inference rule:
P(® j ±) 2 [x;y]
P(® j ±) 2 [u;v]
P(® j ±) 2 [max(x;u);min(y;v)]
20This rule can be seen as an embodiment of the anytime character of their
logic LFH; if we apply this rule whenever it can be applied, we always know
the tightest bounds on the probability of ® given ± that are justi¯ed by our
computation so far. Because we express the lower and upper bounds separately,
we have no need for such an inference rule, but in an implementation we could,
of course, track the largest a for which h(®^±;1)(±;¡a) j >i is in our database
and the smallest b for which h(±;b)(® ^ ±;¡1) j >i is in it.
Consider now, for example, the axioms for probability used in the logic of
Fagin, Halpern and Meggido [3]:
P1 ¹(X) ¸ 0 for all X 2 X
P2 ¹(S) = 1
P300 ¹(X) = ¹(X \ Y ) + ¹(X \ Y )
We may write P300 equivalently as: if P(® ^ ¯) = a and P(® ^ ¯) = b, then
P(®) = a+b. Then, translating each equality into two inequalities and applying
(12), we obtain the following sequent:
(1a) h(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡a) j >i
(1b) h(>;a)(® ^ ¯;¡1) j >i
(2a) h(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡b) j >i
(2b) h(>;b)(® ^ ¯;¡1) j >i
(3a) h(®;1)(>;¡(a + b)) j >i
(3b) h(>;a + b)(®;¡1) j >i
The derivations of the conclusions are straight-forward. Here is a derivation
of (3a) in L:
(i) h(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡a) j >i 1a
(ii) h(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡b) j >i 2a
(iii) h(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡a)(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡b) j >i (i), (ii) Combination
(iv) h(® ^ ¯;1)(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡(a + b)) j >i (iii) Substitution type 6
(v) h((® ^ ¯) _ (® ^ ¯);1)(>;¡(a + b)) j >i (iv) Substitution type 8
(vi) h((®;1)(>;¡(a + b) j >i (v) Substitution type 9
The derivation of (3b) in L follows similar lines:
(i) h(>;a)(® ^ ¯;¡1) j >i 1b
(ii) h(>;b)(® ^ ¯;¡1) j >i 2b
(iii) h(>;a)(® ^ ¯;¡1)(>;b)(® ^ ¯;¡1) j >i (i), (ii) Combination
(iv) h(>;a + b)(® ^ ¯;¡1)(® ^ ¯;¡1;j >i (iii) Substitution type 6
(v) h(>;a + b)((® ^ ¯) _ (® ^ ¯);¡1) j >i (iv) Substitution type 8
(vi) h(>;a + b)((®;¡1) j >i (v) Substitution type 9
Although these proofs are trivial, it is of interest to note that they use only our
21Acceptability rules, and in a sense reveal why P300 is a consequence of our
notion of acceptability of gambles. Since our logic L is complete, we know that
all Frisch and Haddawy's inference rules can be derived in L. Nevertheless, it
may provide some insight into the operation of our logic to show how they
may be derived. For example, Frisch and Haddawy's Rule (vii) says:
P(¯ j ±) 2 [x;y]
P(® j ¯ ^ ±) 2 [u;v]
P(® ^ ¯ j ±) 2 [x ¢ u;y ¢ v]
In L, this can be written as the sequent:
(1a) h(¯;1)(>;¡x) j ±i
(1b) h(>;y)(¯;¡1) j ±i
(2a) h(®;1)(>;¡u) j ¯ ^ ±i
(2b) h(>;v)(®;¡1) j ¯ ^ ±i
(3a) h(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡(x ¢ u)) j ±i
(3b) h(>;(y ¢ v))(® ^ ¯;¡1) j ±i
The ¯rst half of this sequent, (3a), may be derived in L as follows:
(i) h(¯;1)(>;¡x) j ±i 1a
(ii) h(®;1)(>;¡u) j ¯ ^ ±i 2a
(iii) h(® ^ ¯ ^ ±;1)(> ^ ¯ ^ ±;¡u) j ±i (ii) Contingency ¯ ^ ± )0 ±
(iv) h(® ^ ¯;1)(> ^ ¯;¡u) j ±i (iii) Updating ± )0 ±
(v) h(® ^ ¯;1)(¯;¡u) j ±i (iv) Substitution type 9
(vi) h(¯;u)(>;¡(x ¢ u) j ±i (i) Scaling u ¸ 0
(vii) h(® ^ ¯;1)(¯;¡u)(¯;u)(>;¡(x ¢ u) j ±i (v), (vi) Combination
(viii) h(® ^ ¯;1)(¯;0)(>;¡(x ¢ u) j ±i (vii) Substitution type 6
(ix) h(® ^ ¯;1)(>;¡(x ¢ u) j ±i (viii) Substitution type 2
The structure of the derivation of the ¯nal part of the sequent, (3b) follows the
same lines and in the interests of space is left as an exercise for the reader. In
the derivations shown here, each of our inference rules has played some part,
though we have chosen examples where the use of Updating is trivial (cf. line
iv in the derivation above, where we rely only on ± )0 ±); in this article we do
not explore the signi¯cance and power of this particular form of Updating
or the consequences of adopting weaker versions instead. However, our axiom
of Rationality has not been needed. We leave it to the reader to con¯rm
that it is required, for example, to prove Frisch and Haddawy's Rule (v).
226 Summary and Conclusions
Why stop with a language that is only hyperplane expressive? Why not fur-
ther expand the language so that it can say anything one pleases about the
probabilities of sentences in the underlying logic? There are two obvious ways
to answer this question:
² If we are really only interested in the probabilities of individual sentences,
as Nilsson and Frisch and Haddawy appeared to be, then there is no reason
to generalize further.
² We might feel that we want more than bounds on individual probabilities,
but that hyperplane expressiveness is enough. Most practical work with
probabilities is directed towards decision-making, and we might argue that
decisions depend only on the acceptability of gambles.
We might also challenge the ontological role of probabilities. Is a probability
something with a reality of its own, or is it only a way of expressing our
attitudes? If it is only a way of expressing our attitudes, and if the attitudes
in question come down to the willingness to accept gambles, then we step
outside what is meaningful when we go beyond hyperplane expressiveness.
This is the view taken by Walley.
Walley's view throws into question, of course, the presumption that a proba-
bilistic logic should use probability measures as interpretations. If the reality
to which we are referring has only acceptable gambles, then perhaps these, not
probabilities, should be our interpretations. Perhaps also some of our inference
rules should be reconsidered. In particular, the conditioning rule Updating
can be called into question, for it does not have a clear direct justi¯cation in
terms of the acceptability of gambles.
Our work in this area is motivated by our interest in moving beyond stan-
dard probability measures as a semantics for probabilistic logic. In addition to
relaxing inference rules such as Updating to investigate alternative formula-
tions for conditional probability, we are also interested in shifting away from
the static framework of a sample space. This would move probabilistic logic in
the direction of temporal and causal logic, and would make contact with our
earlier work on basing logic on the concept of an event space [12]. See [13].
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